Pictures of the surface of the sun

Wow those scientists get up to all kinds of wild and crazy things... :-)



http://www.thesurfaceofthesun.com/index.html

Canadian Blog Awards

http://cba.myblahg.com/

Christmas Giving

Hi! already told some of you about the Rockin’ For Research
Gala in Vancouver, to raise money for the Juvenile Diabetes Research
Foundation. was a blast. you click on the link below, and
listen to Song #1, you’ll hear one of the songs featured night
before the live show. part in it is pretty mellow, but it was
built around THOSE KIDS, who made me cry in the studio and again at the
gala just watching the slideshow of them all. were sweet and
strong and wonderful. Crying and singing is actually quite hard.





I’m aware that I would not be giving birth to our second child in
January without the absolutely phenomenal research that has changed the
face of 1 diabetes treatment since my diagnosis 30 years ago.
then people could only dream about having the kind of technology,
care, and “normal” experiences that we do today. advance has
made life more livable. the dangers associated with extreme high
and low blood sugar levels in us are still life-threatening and a 24
hours-a-day challenge. />



If you’re looking for a late write-off this year, the site makes it
very easy to make a donation of any size, from anywhere, to better the
future for so many little kids who face a lifetime riding the roller
coaster of insulin therapy and frightening diabetic complications.
you aren’t able to contribute, just passing this link on will be a
great help. it out!





Thanks, love, and good health,





Saffron




http://www.jdrf.ca/rockin

Satire: End-life crisis marked by extravagant spending spree

Ever since his retirement nearly a decade ago, area resident Oscar Subitzky just hasn't been the same.

What
began as a single, uncharacteristic extravagance-the payment of $15,000
for a coronary angioplasty to expand his narrowing arterial wall-has
given way to a growing number of personal luxuries, from the latest
brand-name heart medications to the most advanced palliative care.

The
unusual developments have led concerned family members to suspect that
the once prudent and conservative 74-year-old widower is undergoing an
acute end-life crisis.

Birthday day at the daycare.

Snowy Night

What not to get your kids for Christmas


Avoid the loony Zune
(http://www.suntimes.com/technology/ihnatko/147048,CST-FIN-Andy23.article)

November 23, 2006

BY ANDY IHNATKO

Y es, Microsoft's new Zune digital music player is just plain dreadful. I've spent a week setting this thing up and using it, and the overall experience is about as pleasant as having an airbag deploy in your face.

"Avoid," is my general message. The Zune is a square wheel, a product that's so absurd and so obviously immune to success that it evokes something akin to a sense of pity.

The setup process stands among the very worst experiences I've ever had with digital music players. The installer app failed, and an hour into the ordeal, I found myself asking my office goldfish, "Has it really come to this? Am I really about to manually create and install a .dll file?"

But there it was, right on the Zune's tech support page. Is this really what parents want to be doing at 4 a.m. on Christmas morning?
That might not be Zune's fault. After about a year of operation, it's almost as if a Windows machine develops some sort of antibodies that prevent it from recognizing new hardware. But what's Microsoft's excuse for everything else?

Only the Zune software can sync music, video and pictures onto the device; Zune is incompatible with Windows Media Player, the familiar hub of the Windows desktop media experience.

The Zune app doesn't even have as many features as WMP. And why (for the love of God) doesn't it support podcasts? That's pure insanity.

It's incompatible with Microsoft's own PlaysForSure standard, too.

You'll have to buy all-new content from the new Zune Marketplace.

Oh, and the Zune Marketplace doesn't even take real money, proving that on the Zune Planet there's no operation so simple that it can't be turned into a confusing ordeal. The Marketplace only accepts Zune Points, with an individual track typically costing the equivalent of the iTunes-standard 99 cents.

By forcing users to buy blocks of Zune Points (with a $5 minimum), the Marketplace only has to pay one credit-card processing fee.

Zune Points will also make it easier for the Zune Marketplace to institute variable pricing. The music industry wants it desperately. The industry has been pressuring Apple to abandon its flat 99 cent pricing and start charging more for "hot" tracks.

Apple has stood firm against this, insisting that low, uniform prices keep sales high and discourage the iTunes Store's users from downloading music illegally.

I'm certain Microsoft will cave on this one. It has already given the music industry the other thing the industry has been demanding from Apple: a kickback on every player sold.

"These devices are just repositories for stolen music, and they all know it," said Doug Morris, CEO of Universal Music Group. "So it's time to get paid for it."
Well, Morris is just a big, clueless idiot, of course. Do you honestly want morons like him to have power over your music player?

Then go ahead and buy a Zune. You'll find that the Zune Planet orbits the music industry's Bizarro World, where users aren't allowed to do anything that isn't in the industry's direct interests.

Take the Zune's one unique and potentially ginchy feature: Wi-Fi. You see this printed on the box and you immediately think "Cool. So I can sync files from my desktop library without having to plug in a USB cable, right? Maybe even download new content directly to the device from the Internet?"

Typical, selfish user: How does your convenience help make money for Universal? No wonder Doug despises you.

No, the Zune's sole wireless feature is "squirting" -- I know, I know, it's Microsoft's term, not mine -- music and pictures to any other Zune device within direct Wi-Fi range. Even if the track is inherently free (like a podcast) the Zune wraps it in a DRM scheme that causes the track to self-destruct after three days or three plays, whichever comes first.

After that, it's nothing more than a bookmark for purchasing the track in the Zune Marketplace. It amounts to nothing more than free advertising.

The Zune is a complete, humiliating failure. Toshiba's Gigabeat player, for example, is far more versatile, it has none of the Zune's limitations, and Amazon sells the 30-gig model for 40 bucks less.

Throw in the Zune's tail-wagging relationship with music publishers, and it almost becomes important that you encourage people not to buy one.

The iPod owns 85 percent of the market because it deserves to. Apple consistently makes decisions that benefit the company, the users and the media publishers -- and they continue to innovatively expand the device's capabilities without sacrificing its simplicity.

Companies such as Toshiba and Sandisk (with its wonderful Nano-like Sansa e200 series) compete effectively with the iPod by asking themselves, "What are the things that users want and Apple refuses to provide?"

Microsoft's colossal blunder was to knock the user out of that question and put the music industry in its place.

Result: The Zune will be dead and gone within six months. Good riddance.

Andy Ihnatko writes on technical and computer issues for the Sun-Times.

High school sports - impact of...

Robert Lipsyte
Link
Special to Page 2

This is what I learned in high school this year: The kids are not all right, and some of them even know why.

I've been talking to high school kids, especially jocks, on my book tour for "Raiders Night," a controversial new young-adult novel about the aftermath of a brutal training-camp hazing incident. In the book, the coaches, the school and the town try to put a lid on the incident. On the tour, coaches, schools and towns have been trying to put a lid on the book.

...

As it turned out, the high school kids I did get to, in New York, Illinois, Michigan and California, weren't all that concerned about the language, the sex and drugs in the book, either. It was what they lived with every day. They said they could handle that. What they did want to talk about was something they obviously couldn't handle – betrayal by adult society.

At one suburban Chicago high school where more than a hundred juniors and seniors had read the book before I came to speak, the football players I talked to privately wanted to vent about their profound and sophisticated mistrust of coaches.

If everything is going according to plan...

You probably have the wrong plan. Following that general rule I decide to go in and reinforce my daughters good behavior today. 45 minutes in her room doing "quiet time" - this has replaced nap - without coming out and really without incident. The reason for the silence - Dad had left a permanent fabric marker in the room. Note: it also works on plastic, wood and metal and it really is permanent. The idea of installing a wireless web cam comes to the fore again. :-)

Arphid Watch: Find Own Foot, Aim Hastily, Pull Trigger

Excerpted from Bruce Scheider - Security Expert Blog - his commentary has been italicized. His commentary is included within the body of the original story from the Guardian, one of England's better newspapers. Note that Canada and the U.S. are proposing a very similar approach with all the attendant flaws.

http://blog.wired.com/sterling/2006/11/arphid_watch_fi.html

Cracked it!

Three million Britons have been issued with the new hi-tech passport, designed to frustrate terrorists and fraudsters. So why did Steve Boggan and a friendly computer expert find it so easy to break the security codes?
Steve Boggan Friday November 17, 2006 Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/idcards/story/0,,1950226,00.html

Six months ago, with the help of a rather scary computer expert, I deconstructed the life of an airline passenger simply by using information garnered from a boarding-pass stub he had thrown into a dustbin on the Heathrow Express. By using his British Airways frequent-flyer number and buying a ticket in his name on the airline's website, we were able to access his personal data, passport number, date of birth and nationality. Based on this information, using publicly available databases, we found out where he lived, his profession, all his academic qualifications and even how much his house was worth.

It would have been only a short hop to stealing his identity, committing fraud in his name and generally ruining his life.

Great news then, we thought, that the UK had just begun to issue new, ultra-secure passports, incorporating tiny microchips to store the holder's details and a digital description of their physical features (known in the jargon as biometrics). These, the argument went, would make identity theft much more difficult and pave the way for the government's proposed ID cards in 2008 or 2009.

Today, some three million such passports have been issued, and they don't look so secure. I am sitting with my scary computer man and we have just sucked out all the supposedly secure data and biometric information from three new passports and displayed it all on a laptop computer.

The UK Identity and Passport Service website says the new documents are protected by "an advanced digital encryption technique". So how come we have the information? What could criminals or terrorists do with it? And what could it mean for the passports and the ID cards that are meant to follow?

First it is necessary to explain why the new passports were introduced, and how they work. After the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre, in which fake passports were used, the US decided it wanted foreign citizens who presented themselves at its borders to have more secure "machine-readable" identity documents. It told 27 countries that participated in a visa waiver programme that citizens with passports issued after the 26th of last month must have micro-chipped biometric passports or would have to apply for a US visa. Among those 27 countries are the major EU members, and other friendly nations ranging from Andorra and Iceland to Singapore, Japan and Brunei. The UK, of course, is also included.

(((If we simply returned to the security situation status quo ante on 9/10 instead of 9/11, it would be like the civilized world suddenly got over a massive, self-inflicted stupidity virus. Furthermore, we'd be a lot safer.)))

Standards for the new passports were set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 2003 and adopted by the waiver countries and the US. The ICAO recommended that passports should contain facial biometrics, though countries could introduce fingerprints at a later date. All these would be stored on a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) microchip, which can be accessed from a short distance using radio waves. Similar chips are commonly found in retail, where they are used for stock control.

Fatally, however, the ICAO suggested that the key needed to access the data on the chips should be comprised of, in the following order, the passport number, the holder's date of birth and the passport expiry date, all of which are contained on the printed page of the passport on a "machine readable zone."

When an immigration official swipes the passport through a reader, this feeds in the key, which allows a microchip reader to communicate with the RFID chip. The data this contains, including the holder's picture, is then displayed on the official's screen. The assumption at this stage is that this document is as authentic as it is super-secure. And, as we shall see later, this could be highly significant.

Once the passports began to be issued in the UK in March, we began laying the foundations for examining them. Phil Booth, national coordinator of the campaign group NO2ID, suggested to his members that they apply for a new passport. Anyone who gets one before ID cards are rolled out will not have to register for a card until their passports expire in 10 years' time, and this appealed to Booth.

At the same time, Adam Laurie, my computer expert and technical director of the Bunker Secure Hosting, a Kent-based computer security company, and I began laying plans to examine the new passports. Laurie is actually not a scary individual - he is regarded in the industry as a technical wizard who cares about privacy and civil rights - but much of the electronic information he uncovers is. Two years ago, he revealed that Bluetooth mobile phones could be accessed remotely, drained of their contact details, diary entries and pictures, and manipulated to act as bugging devices. The cellphone industry spent millions of pounds plugging the gaps he exposed.

By last month, Booth, Laurie and I each had access to a new biometric chipped passport and were ready to begin testing them. (((Three guys. No budget to speak of. Mayhem ensues.))) Laurie's first port of call was the ICAO's website, where the organisation had published specifications for the new travel documents. This is where he learned that the key to opening up the secure chip was contained in the passports themselves - passport number, date of birth and expiry date.

"I was amazed that they made it so easy," Laurie says. "The information contained in the chip is not encrypted, but to access it you have to start up an encrypted conversation between the reader and the RFID chip in the passport.

"The reader - I bought one for £250 - (((okay, there must have been SOME budget))) has to say hello to the chip and tell it that it is authorised to make contact. The key to that is in the date of birth, etc. Once they communicate, the conversation is encrypted, but I wrote some software in about 48 hours that made sense of it. (((I hate reading stuff like this. "About 48 hours." Couldn't it have been at least 48 days or something?)))

"The Home Office has adopted a very high encryption technology called 3DES - that is, to a military-level data-encryption standard times three. So they are using strong cryptography to prevent conversations between the passport and the reader being eavesdropped, but they are then breaking one of the fundamental principles of encryption by using non-secret information actually published in the passport to create a 'secret key'. That is the equivalent of installing a solid steel front door to your house and then putting the key under the mat." (((Oh jeez. It's as Neal Stephenson said: cryptography is like a picket fence around your house that consists of one picket ninety miles tall.)))

Within minutes of applying the three passports to the reader, the information from all of them has been copied and the holders' images appear on the screen of Laurie's laptop. The passports belong to Booth, and to Laurie's son, Max, and my partner, who have all given their permission.

But could you - and what use would my passport be to you? A security feature of the chip ensures that information cannot be added or altered, so you couldn't put your picture on my chip. So is our attack really so impressive?

The Home Office thinks not. It correctly points out that the information sucked out of the chip is only the same as that which appears on the page, readable with the human eye. And to obtain the key in the first place, you would need to have access to the passport to read (with the naked eye) its number, expiry date and the date of birth of its holder.

"This doesn't matter," says a Home Office spokesman. "By the time you have accessed the information on the chip, you have already seen it on the passport. What use would my biometric image be to you? And even if you had the information, you would still have to counterfeit the new passport - and it has lots of new security features. If you were a criminal, you might as well just steal a passport."

However, some computer experts believe the Home Office is being dangerously naive. Several months ago, Lukas Grunwald, founder of DN-Systems Enterprise Solutions in Germany, conducted a similar attack to ours on a German biometric passport and succeeded in cloning its RFID chip. He believes unscrupulous criminals or terrorists would find this technology very useful.

"If you can read the chip, then you can clone it," he says. "You could use this to clone a passport that would exploit the system to illegally enter another country." (We did not clone any of our passport chips on the assumption that to do so would be illegal.)

Grunwald adds: "The problems could get worse when they put fingerprint biometrics on to the passports. There are established ways of making forged fingerprints. In the future, the authorities would like to have automated border controls, and such forged fingerprints [stuck on to fingers] would probably fool them."

But what about facial recognition systems (your biometric passport contains precise measurements of key points on your face and head)? "Yes," says Grunwald, "but they are not yet in operation at airports and the technology throws up between 20 and 25% false negatives or false positives. It isn't reliable."

Neither is the human eye, according to research conducted by a team of psychologists from the University of Westminster in 1996. Remember, information - such as a new picture - cannot be added to a cloned chip, so anyone using it to make a counterfeit passport would have to use one that bore a reasonable resemblance to themselves.

But during Westminster University's study, which examined whether putting people's images on credit cards might reduce fraud, supermarket staff drafted in for tests had great difficulty matching faces to pictures. The conclusion was that pictures would not improve security and they were never introduced on credit cards. This means that each time you hand over your passport at, say, a hotel reception or car-rental office abroad to be "photocopied", it could be cloned with equipment like ours. This could have been done with an old passport, but since the new biometric passports are supposed to be secure they are more likely to be accepted without question at borders.

Given the results of the Westminster study, if a terrorist bore a slight resemblance to you - and grew a beard, perhaps - he would have a good chance of getting through a border. Because his chip is cloned, with the necessary digital signatures, and because you have not reported your passport stolen - you still have it! - his machine-readable travel document will get him wherever he wants to go, using your identity. (((In other words, electronic passport theft is about as handy as regular, commercial identity theft. The real hell would come if the authorities didn't bother to stare at the passport but simply trusted the signal from the chip. Which was supposed to be the idea in the first place: these arphids are supposed to be making transit SAFER AND FASTER AND MORE CONVENIENT, not just introducing a new level of Rube Goldberg snafu.)))

What about the technical difficulties? The government claims the new biometric passport chips can be read over a distance of just 2cm, but researchers all over the world claim to have read them from further. The physics governing those in British passports says they could be read over a metre, but no one has yet done that. A Dutch team claims to have contacted chips at 30cm.

Laurie has, however, rigged up a piece of equipment that can connect to a passport over 7.5cm. That isn't as far as the Dutch 30cm, but it is enough if your target subject is sitting next to you on the London Underground or crushed up against you on the Gatwick Airport monorail, his pocketed passport next to the reader you have hidden in a bag. ((("Arphid pickpockets.")))

It takes around four seconds to suck out the information with a reader; then it can be relayed and unscrambled by an accomplice with a laptop up to 1km away. With a Heath Robinson device we built on Tuesday using a Bluetooth antenna connected to an RFID reader, Laurie relayed details of his son's passport over a distance of 10 metres and through two walls to a laptop.

Ah, the Home Office will say, but you still need to see the information in the passport that will form the key needed for connection. Well, not necessarily. Consider this scenario: A postman involved with organised crime knows he has a passport to deliver to your home. He already knows your name and address from the envelope. He can get your date of birth by several means, including credit-reference agencies or from the register of births, marriages and deaths (and, let's face it, he delivers all your birthday cards anyway).

He knows the expiry date - 10 years from yesterday, give or take a day, when the passport was mailed to you. That leaves the nine-digit passport number. NO2ID says reports from its 30,000 members up and down the country are throwing up a number of similarities in the first four digits of the passport number, so that reduces the number of permutations, potentially leaving five purely random numbers to establish.

"If the rogue postman were to take your passport home, without opening the envelope he could put it against a reader and begin a 'brute force' attack in which your computer tries 12 different permutations every second until it has the right access codes," says Laurie. "A five-digit number would take 23 hours to crack at the most. Once all those numbers were established, you could communicate with the RFID chip and steal all the information. And your passport could be delivered to you, unopened and just a day late."

But is this really credible? Would criminals or terrorists really go to such lengths? (((Governments certainly would; do you think Mossad agents are going to be wandering around with clumsily forged passports?))) Ross Anderson, professor of security engineering at the University of Cambridge computer laboratory, believes they would. "The point is that once you have extracted the data from the chip you can have a forged passport that contains not just forged physical stuff," he says. "You also have the digital bit-stream so the digital signature of the passport checks out. That makes it possible to travel through borders with it.

"What concerns me is that this demonstrates bad design on the part of the Home Office, and we know that government IT projects have a habit of going terribly wrong. There is a lack of security in what we can see - so what about the 90% of the iceberg in the system that we can't see?

"There isn't even a defence against the brute-force attack. In much the same way as you are only allowed three attempts to feed in your PIN number at an ATM, the passport chip could have been made to stop allowing repeated incorrect attempts to contact it. As things stand, a computer can keep trying until it gets the numbers right. To say this doesn't matter displays a cavalier lack of concern." (((What it really displays is that government spooks intend to do all this anyway, and they can't believe that private sector spooks and hobbyists can take the trouble. Rather like the Pentagon unable to believe that Al Qaeda can make serious mischief.)))

The problems we have identified with RFID chips in passports raise all sorts of questions about the UK's proposed ID card scheme, which will use the same technology. The government has not said exactly what will be contained in the ID card's chip, but there will be a National Identity Register that could contain around 50 pieces of information about you, ranging from your name, age, and all your addresses, to your national insurance number and biometric details. Eventually, you may need one to access healthcare. It could even replace the passport.

Already, then, criminals and terrorists will have identified just how useful cloned ID cards might be. It would be folly to think their best minds are not on the case.

The Home Office insists that UK passports are secure and among the best in the world, but not everyone agrees. Last week, an EU-funded body entitled the Future of Identity in the Information Society (Fidis) issued a declaration on machine-readable travel documents such as RFID-chipped passports and ID cards. It said the technology was "poorly conceived" and added: "European governments have effectively forced citizens to adopt new ... documents which dramatically decrease their security and privacy and increase risk of identity theft."

(((They did this, not because they want to make private citizens more secure against ID theft, but because they want to install huge databases that track the movements of civil populations generally. The point of electronic ID is to input a suspect passport number and see every place that guy's been in the last 20 years. Then you compare that the movements of other known malefactors and you've got an instant Al Qaeda winnowing-machine.)))

(((Of course some individuals will suffer, but compared to the awesome imaginary benefits of Total Information Awareness, that's like watching a few Nevada civilians cough up their lungs from atom-bomb tests.)))

The government is now facing demands from the Liberal Democrats and anti-ID card groups for a recall of the passports so that simple devices such as foil covers can be installed - at enormous cost. Such covers would at least stop chips being scanned remotely, though they wouldn't prevent an unscrupulous hotel receptionist from opening the passport and sucking out its contents the way we did.

It may be that at some point in the future the government will accept that putting RFID chips in to passports is ill-conceived and unnecessary. Until then, the only people likely to embrace this kind of technology are those with mischief in mind.
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006
Posted by Bruce Sterling 4:37 AM PST |

Austin
Notwithstanding the pastel colours he looks quite happy.

Of course, they are both this calm all the time. My children are little angels. Of course, that may be due to the small boxes I keep them in... :-)

UK is a surveillance society
From www.boingboing.net

The UK information commissioner called Britain a surveillance society, where "dataveillance" of buying habits is combined with cameras and other surveillance methods to track practically every movement of Britons.

I saw this first hand, as when the London Underground phased out almost all forms of paper tickets in favor of the inherently less private RFID-based Oyster card (the only paper tickets remaining were single-rideday tickets, and the LU doubled the price of those). Even the banks get in on the act -- Citibank UK sent me a "mandatory questionnaire" that demanded that I disclose every source of income I have or might have or had, all property I owned all over the world, whom I loaned mney to and why, and so on -- they claimed that this was to comply with British terrorism rules. When I confronted them on this, they backed down and said it was an optional mandatory questionnaire.

Not only are cameras all over Britain -- especially London -- but many indoor spaces have rules that say you aren't allowed to shield yourself from their gaze, prohibiting motorcycle helmets and even hooded sweatshirts. The hoodie has become a symbol of surveillance-dodging hooligans -- a favorite (ab)use of the expansive, extra-judicial "anti-social behaviour orders" (ASBOs) is to order kids to stop wearing camera-foiling hooded jumpers.

The report's co-writer Dr David Murakami-Wood told BBC News that, compared to other industrialised Western states, the UK was "the most surveilled country".

"We have more CCTV cameras and we have looser laws on privacy and data protection," he said.

"We really do have a society which is premised both on state secrecy and the state not giving up its supposed right to keep information under control while, at the same time, wanting to know as much as it can about us."